The starting point is the old 50/50 rule (ie less than 50% of the room will have a light level of one lumen per sq ft – which is the amount of light needed for reading without artificial light on an ordinary overcast day). If that rule is breached, then traditionally there will have been an infringement of any right to light. However, such concepts are largely derived from the 19th century when artificial lighting was rare – whereas now, of course, it is the norm. Certainly, this was a factor taken into account by a High Court judge in a case earlier this year which involved properties in the City of London where a new block was to be built next to an old block, with the result that there would be a breach of right to light. On the facts, it was decided that it would not be appropriate to grant an injunction, given the nature of the properties and their location in the City. Evidence showed that the offices all used artificial light throughout the day, and in any event, it would be generally beneficial to the City as a whole to allow developments of this sort to proceed. That, coupled with the fact that the claimants were 'only interested in [their property] from a moneymaking point of view', persuaded the judge that an injunction should not be granted. As such, it was seen as an important decision and one that laid down new guidelines for right to light claims involving city centre buildings (where artificial lighting is likely to be the norm).

However, an article in the SJ makes the point that it is important to remember that the High Court judge was merely looking at the question of whether or not an injunction should be granted. As such, the case is not necessarily authority for saying that the amount of light that a building is entitled to is diminished merely because there is the availability of electric lighting; in legal theory, the right to light remains unchanged; it is merely a question of whether an injunction (the traditional remedy in such a case) is appropriate, or whether there should merely be a damages award. Certainly, that is an approach that makes sense, although this case will no doubt encourage further challenges to old-established concepts such as the 50/50 rule. In any event, as we noted in our April issue (p18), the principle that emerges is straightforward: the conventional remedy of an injunction may not be available in city centres, where different standards apply. Accordingly, injunctions would now seem to be less likely to be granted in built-up areas against developers than was previously the case – although that leaves open the question of what the damages should be. See commentary on Midtown v City of London Real Property [2005] EWHC 33 (Ch) in [2005] SJ 967.  © Practical Lawyer