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An enlightening decision
'Proper' and 'reasonable' use of a right of way Print
authorAny occupier of property that benefits from a right of way expressed in wide general terms will be relieved by the recent decision in Brooks v Young [2008], in which an attempt to give such a right a restrictive interpretation was defeated in the Court of Appeal. Although the case was concerned with residential property, the wording used would also be common in a grant of a right of way affecting commercial property.

FACTS OF THE DISPUTE

The dispute was one of those unedifying neighbour disputes. Mr Brooks and Mr Young had bought adjoining properties from the local authority under the right-to-buy legislation. Mr Young’s property benefited from a right of way along the side and across the rear of Mr Brooks’ property, ‘for all proper purposes connected with the reasonable enjoyment of the property’.

Mr Brooks brought proceedings against Mr Young for an injunction to restrain use of the right of way, on the basis that the use being made of it was excessive. He complained that it was used by visitors to the property, to take the dog for a walk, and for wheeling bicycles to and from the house, arguing that it should only be used where the front door could not reasonably be used instead, for example when putting out rubbish bins. He initially succeeded, assisted by two letters written by the local authority at the time when it originally granted the right, indicating what the authority considered to be reasonable use.

OUTCOME

The decision was overturned on the present appeal. First, the judge should not have considered evidence concerning the subjective intention of the local authority at the time it granted the right. The court’s role was to ascertain the parties’ objective intention by interpreting the grant on the basis of the words used. Evidence as to subjective intention is only relevant if a party is asking to have the grant rectified.

More importantly for general purposes, the grant was in terms that permitted a wide general use, and interpreting the grant in such a restrictive way was effectively to rewrite it. Had the parties’ objective intention been to restrict the use of the right, then such wide wording would not have been used. There were no grounds, on the basis of the wording of the grant, for restricting it to occasions where the use of the front door was not reasonably practicable.

COMMENT

Neighbour disputes typically have few lessons other than the undesirability of becoming engaged in one. Here, as well as reassurance for occupiers that wide, general rights should usually be interpreted accordingly, there is the lesson for those drafting them that if some restrictive application is intended, then it should be specifically dealt with in the drafting.

By Mark Shelton, associate, Cobbetts LLP. E-mail:  © In-House Lawyer

July 2008
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